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Mixing River Water and Well Water: The
Harmonization of Hong Kong and PRC Law
The 1998 Wing Tat Lee Lecture*
Tahirih V. Lee**
The Chinese language is rich with pithy yet evocative sayings.
Their terseness makes them easy to remember, fun to use, and
relatively safe when the intended meaning contradicts official
discourse. One such saying, which enjoys a great deal of popularity in
Hong Kong, is he soi batfan hah soi. Roughly translated, this means,
"River water does not mix with well water." The saying's underlying
meaning cannot be found in dictionaries or official sources. According
to rumor, however, river water represents Guangdong' natives and
well water refers to Hong Kong natives. A likely reason for the
saying's popularity in Hong Kong is its emphasis on the gulf between
Hong Kong locals and the inhabitants of mainland China. The saying
implies that this gulf exists even between those as close to each other
as the other side of the border between Hong Kong and China's
Guangdong Province.
Why emphasize the distinction between Hong Kong and southern
China? Such a distinction flies in the face of the economic and political
integration of Hong Kong and China, particularly Southern China, that
has proceeded without interruption since the early 1980s. Since then,
Hong Kong's trade is largely based on exports from China on their
way to various places in the world, and its investment is largely
foreign capital using Hong Kong as a regional headquarters for
*As a result of a gift to the Loyola University Chicago School of Law by Wing Tat
Lee, a Hong Kong businessman and philanthropist, the School of Law established a

lecture series in the area of international and comparative law. The Wing Tat Lee
lectureship has enabled the School of Law to participate in ventures such as the Central
and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar Association and to
invite other speakers to the campus.
**Tahirih V. Lee is an Associate Professor at the Harvard University Fairbank Center
for East Asian Research and an internationally recognized expert on Chinese law and
Comparative Law. She earned her Ph.D. in Chinese History from Yale University and
her J.D. from the Yale Law School. This essay is based on material she gathered during
five research trips to Hong Kong in 1997 and 1998. The author is grateful to the staff at
the Hong Kong High Court and to the law faculty of the City University of Hong Kong
for their generous support and assistance.
1. Guangdong is a province in southern China.
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eventual destination somewhere in mainland China. The distinction
between Hong Kong and southern China further blurred on July 1,
1997 when Hong Kong officially became part of the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") and subject to the sovereignty of the
government of mainland China. On that date, it became a Special
Administrative Region ("SAR") of the PRC, an administrative unit
invested with more autonomy than the provinces of the PRC, but
which nonetheless may not conduct its own foreign affairs or operate
its own military.
Hong Kong's need to distance itself from mainland China stems
from its fear that Beijing will not follow through on its promises of
autonomy. Hong Kong's new constitution, the Basic Law, recognizes
this need by providing that Hong Kong will enjoy "a high degree of
autonomy" (gaodu zizhi),2 and will be a separate "system" within the
single "nation" of China (yiguo liangzhi).3 The Basic Law elaborates
that Hong Kong's autonomy extends so far as to allow for continuity
of Hong Kong's economy, society, and law. It provides that "the
previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for
50 years."4 It is widely acknowledged in Hong Kong that the PRC's
top leaders in Beijing intended these provisions to promote Hong
Kong's continuity during its transition from a British colony to a PRC
Special Administrative Region ("SAR").5
Is the popular fear in Hong Kong unfounded? Examining this
question two years after Hong Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty,
there is little doubt that the official assurances of continuity have
blossomed into the preservation of most of Hong Kong's legal system
and the continuation of Hong Kong's economic and political activities.
Despite indications of continuity, however, Hong Kong's legal system
has changed since July 1, 1997. The most notable changes have
brought Hong Kong's legal system into closer alignment with PRC
law. Legal comparativists and specialists in international business
name this type of convergence "legal harmonization."

2. See Basic Law, Art. 158, reprinted in IAN DOBINSON & DEREK ROEBUCK,
INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN THE HONG KONG SAR 147 (1996) [hereinafter Basic Law].
3. See Basic Law, supra note 2, at Preamble.
4. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Art. 5.
5. See Ng Ka Ling, Ng Tan Tan and Directorof Immigration (Final Appeal no. 14 of
1998), Tsui Kuen Nang and Directorof Immigration (Final Appeal no. 15 of 1998), and
Director of Immigration and Cheung Lai Wah (Final Appeal no. 16 of 1998) at
<http://www.info.gov.hk/jud/guide2cs/html/cfa/judmt/facv-14_16_98.htm>,
at 19
(stating "the Basic Law was enacted to implement China's basic policies regarding Hong
Kong to remain unchanged for 50 years .... ").
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Legal harmonization is important to lawyers conducting business in
more than one country because harmonization decreases transaction
costs. When people of different legal systems come together in a
transaction, they must learn and adjust to the other system, and they
must perform a second set of analyses to conform to the law that
governs the transaction. Legal harmonization in Hong Kong and
China is also of interest to China watchers, politicians, and investors
alike, who are looking for signs of the growth of China's influence in
Asia.
This essay will briefly describe the signs of continuity of Hong
Kong law that provide the context within which Hong Kong's legal
system is changing. 6 This essay will next discuss the legal
harmonization occurring between Hong Kong and the PRC.7 Finally,
this essay will examine the groundwork for such harmonization made
prior to Hong Kong's assumption of SAR status and will attempt to
place Hong Kong's ongoing legal changes in perspective. 8
I.

SIGNS OF CONTINUITY

Official publicity and public protests, among other things,
demonstrate signs of continuity within Hong Kong's legal system.
Official publicity from the government of Hong Kong encourages the
perception of legal continuity in Hong Kong. Dozens of articles
published by the government-controlled PRC press emphasize the
leadership's promises of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" and
"one country, two systems." The first leader of the Hong Kong SAR,
Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, gave several public addresses
asserting that nothing had altered "the rule of law" in Hong Kong. 9
The President of the Hong Kong Law Society,' Anthony Chow,
conducted a campaign during the summer and fall of 1997 which
promoted the idea that the legal system had not changed."
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See Boast of Legal Cornerstone, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 31, 1997, at 2,
available in 1997 WL 13262120 ("The laws previously in force, the court system,
judges, international rights and obligations are to a very large extent the same now as
before July 1.").
10. Like its analog in the United States, the American Bar Association, the Hong
Kong Law Society lobbies on behalf of lawyers, particularly on issues of licensing and
professional responsibility.
11. For evidence of the conservative, pro-Beijing stance of the Law Society's
President Anthony Chow Wing-kin, see May Sin-Mi Hon, Low Profile Advised for Law
Society, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 17, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL 2270456.
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Judging from the dozens of interview responses and informal
remarks made in Hong Kong from May to August, 1997, the official
view may have exerted a significant influence upon popular
perceptions of the effect of the handover on Hong Kong's legal
system. Specifically, a Mastercard poll showed that fewer Hong
Kong residents were contemplating a move from Hong Kong in July
than in April 1997. These figures showed a drop of about sixty
percent, with fifteen percent of pollees contemplating a move in April
and only 6.2 percent contemplating a move in July. Only thirty-four
percent of people questioned by the University of Hong Kong's Social
Science Research Centre in July 1997, were "less confident" about the
"rule of law" after the Hong Kong government took measures to
deport PRC children who sought to enforce their new right of abode in
Hong Kong under the SAR's constitution, the Basic Law (Jibenfa).2
Although in January 1999, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
declared the measures unconstitutional and invalid, when the measures
were enacted, barely more than a third polled expressed the view that
the measures signaled a change of course for Hong Kong's legal
system. 13
In addition, the holdover of superficial accoutrements of Hong
Kong's court system have bolstered the official and popular views of
continuity. For example, judges and barristers still wear unflattering
and expensive horsehair wigs, a visual reminder of Hong Kong's
roots in the British common law. Barristers appearing before both the
Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate High Court also
address the bench as "M'lord" or "M'lady," another vestige of British
common law tradition.
More substantial signs of continuity have encouraged public
perception that Hong Kong and PRC law remain as distinct as ever.
For example, English continues to be the primary language in the
courts. Almost all hearings are conducted in English even when
parties and witnesses can neither speak it nor understand it. The first
trial in Cantonese occurred about a month after the handover and was
regarded as a special accommodation rather than the beginning of a
trend away from the use of English in the courts. Another sign of
legal continuity in Hong Kong is that the public still has access to most
court hearings and major legislative sessions. Anyone may simply
walk in and observe from designated seats and no time limit is set on
12. See Handover 'Brings No Change,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25, 1997, at 6,
available in 1997 WL 2271476.

13. See supra note 5 (stating that China's basic policies regarding Hong Kong will be
stipulated in the Basic Law to remain unchanged for fifty years).
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visits. As before, security is relaxed or nonexistent, with no electronic
screening at either the court or legislative buildings, no identification
checks at the courts, and no more than cursory checks at the
legislature. Observers may also bring bags into the courtrooms and
may take notetaking materials into the legislative meeting room after
checking bags at the front door.
Perhaps the most significant signs of continuity in Hong Kong were
the anti-government demonstrations carried out and the protest banners
displayed in the streets of Hong Kong the first year after the handover.
For the most part, Hong Kong officials permitted these public displays
of dissent, despite the sensitive nature of the critiques. Public
demonstrations were not a way of life under British rule. Prior to
Hong Kong's SAR status, the only notable demonstrations were those
against the Tiananmen Square incident. The demonstrations after the
handover signaled legal continuity, however, because they showed a
continued tolerance by the Hong Kong government of public
expression of dismay with PRC policies.
Some protests targeted the Provisional Legislative Council, the first
legislature of the Hong Kong SAR, because a committee appointed by
Beijing, rather than a popular franchise, elected it. During the
handover ceremonies, the leaders of Hong Kong's Democratic Party
conducted the most notable protest. Led by its President Martin Lee,
the Party's luminaries, including recently ousted legislators Margaret
Ng and Szeto Wah, gave speeches from the balcony of the Legislative
Council building and roused the crowd of over a thousand onlookers
to openly oppose the new legislature. Hong Kong officials deemed
the protest illegal because the protesters occupied the government
building without permission. In response, however, police merely
patrolled the crowd to ensure that the protest did not spill beyond
cordoned areas in front of the building and around the military
memorial across the street.
Other protestors criticized the PRC government directly. An
organization calling itself the April 5th Action Group rallied outside the
Hong Kong Convention Center during the handover ceremonies held
there. 4 On the eve of July 1, 1997, the group's members shouted,
"down with Li Peng!" for ordering People's Liberation Army ("PLA")
troops to fire on students and workers near Tiananmen Square eight
years earlier.5
14. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the response of government
police to this protest).
15. See Stella Lee, Complaint Lodged Over Blast of Beethoven, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 12, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL 2269764.
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Unionists and religious groups attacked the Provisional Legislative
Council's moves in July 1997 to freeze a package of labor laws
enacted by its predecessor on the eve of the handover. 16 The message
blared through Hong Kong's financial district from convoys of
vehicles streaming with banners, from the visitor's gallery in the
central chamber of the Legislative Council building, 17 and in prayer
vigils, fasts, and speeches delivered near the Star Ferry and outside the
Chief Executive's offices. These protestors accused the Hong Kong
government of opposing labor and siding with "business tycoons."
In the landmark decision HKSAR and Davis Ma Waikwan and two
others,18 decided July 22, 1997, the Hong Kong High Court bolstered
the continuity of Hong Kong's legal system when a three-judge panel
unanimously ruled that the common law had survived the handover.
With this ruling, the court rejected the defendants' argument that
Article 160 of the Basic Law contemplated the expiration of the
common law absent a formal act of adoption by the Provisional
Legislative Council.19
The PRC left the vast majority of Hong Kong laws intact when it
resumed sovereignty. The National People's Congress ("NPC")
Standing Committee, the body charged with overseeing the daily work
16. The bill debated in the Provisional Legislative Council on July 8-11, 1997 was
named "Legislative Provisions (Suspension of Operation) Bill 1997." It "suspend[ed]
the question of the legislative changes effected by the following Ordinance:
Employment (Amendment) (No. 4) Ordinance 1997; Occupational Deafness
(Compensation) (Amendment) Ordinance 1997; Employee's Rights to Representation,
Consultation and Collective Bargaining Ordinance 1997; Trade Unions (Amendment)
(No. 2) Ordinance 1997; Protection of the Harbour Ordinance; Hong Kong Bill of Rights
(Amendment) Ordinance 1997." Brief prepared by the Hong Kong Executive Council, a
government body that advises the Chief Executive, for the Provisional Legislative
Council, at 1 (unpublished, copy on file with the author).
The last two of these laws were not labor laws, but the others all had introduced
protections for workers, such as collective bargaining and redress for dismissal after
engaging in union activities. The Executive Council argued that these laws "have a
serious adverse impact on Government policies and operations .... " Id. at 2. The laws
had been enacted on the eve of the handover. For example, Governor Patten had signed
the Collective Bargaining statute on June 9, 1997. See Hong Kong Ordinance No. 100
of 1997, Employment (Amendment) (No. 5).
17. See Stella Lee, Extended Bail for Protesters,S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29,
1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 13261865.
18. HKSAR and Davis Ma Waikwan and two others, 1997-2 HKC 315, available in
1997 HKC Lexis 57, 22 July 1997 (Hong Kong High Court, July 22, 1997).
19. This landmark constitutional law decision was rushed through the intermediate
court on interlocutory appeal because the defendants raised two defenses which touched
on foundational issues for the new SAR. One issue was whether the common law
survived the handover, and the other was whether the Provisional Legislative Council
was validly constituted. The Court ruled in the affirmative on both, after asserting that
Hong Kong courts did not have the authority to query into the acts of the PRC.
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of the NPC, slated only 1.3 percent of 1760 laws and regulations in
Hong Kong for expiration at midnight, June 30, 1997.20 Among
them, three provisions of the recently enacted Hong Kong Bill of
Rights were designated to expire on the basis that they conflicted with
the Basic Law. Those provisions, Articles 2(3), and 4 of the Bill of
Rights, were the most sweeping in scope and power of all those in the
statute. Together, they expressly incorporated a provision of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights into Hong Kong
law. Britain had previously exempted Hong Kong from participation
in the covenant through the reservation it attached to its signature of the
Covenant. Article Three made the Bill of Rights supreme over all
Hong Kong law, past, and future.
II. SIGNS OF HARMONIZATION
Although Hong Kong law showed signs of continuity after its
transfer to Chinese sovereignty, evidence emerged that suggested that
Hong Kong Law is gradually metamorphosizing into the image of its
new sovereign. This evidence comes in the form of both legislative
changes and new political conditions in Hong Kong that favor the
harmonization of its law with PRC law.
Anything that promotes local unity is conducive to the
harmonization of local law with an outside legal system. By the same
token, local disagreement is an impediment to harmonization with
another locality. Harmonization is different from outright conquest, in
which an outside legal power relies upon strategies such as "divideand-conquer" to force a locality to adopt its law. In a harmonization
situation, a locality independently decides to adopt an outside law.
The locality harmonizes either by negotiating with an outside power or
by willingly surrendering to an outside power that the locality admires
or views as advantageous. Local unity facilitates the process of
inviting in outside law because this invitation is a local decision and
such unity facilitates the local community's decision making process.
In at least one sense, harmonization is the inverse of conquest. With
harmonization, an inside power convinces a locality to adopt outside
law; with conquest, an outside power convinces a locality to adopt
outside law.
In Hong Kong, local disagreement and local tolerance of pluralism
further impede harmonization with the PRC because such dissent and
pluralism are at odds with official culture in the PRC. The official
culture's preference for harmony has deep historical roots in China and
20. See Issues on Laws Adopted By the HKSAR, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 27, 1997, at 4.
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is most vividly symbolized by the doctrine of the "heavenly mandate"
which legitimized the emperor's rule so long as peace reigned
throughout the land.
Local unity can be fostered in many ways, such as sharpening the
focus of the local government or quelling dissent. Such unity was
shown in 1997 by growing cooperation between business elites and
the Hong Kong government. For example, one week before the Hong
Kong handover, reports surfaced that Tung Chee-hwa's close
business associates from his long career as a shipping magnate
enjoyed more access to him than did Anson Chan who is the head of
the Hong Kong civil service and Tung's right hand man according to
the constitution. In another symbol of the thinning line between
government and business, Tung and his new Secretary of Justice,
Elsie Leung, were publicly accused of flouting bureaucratic practices
by putting their personal secretaries from their private sector firms
directly into government posts. In its first week, the new government
also moved to freeze pro-union labor laws enacted on the eve of the
handover. Six weeks later, the government scrapped two of those
laws that most threatened big business: those that introduced collective
bargaining and those that protected workers from termination for union
activities. 2
As further evidence of the growing elitism of Hong Kong's
government, in early November 1997, on the strength of a poll of
Hong Kong's business community, the government rejected the
Consumer Council's proposal to enact a competition law to fight pricefixing and monopolies. Although the government portrayed the poll as
reflective of public opinion, the 110 bodies polled "consisted almost
entirely of business associations and monopolies."22 Critics of the
government's move asserted that the law would have contributed
21. See Genevieve Chan, Activists in Last-Ditch Bid to Save Labour Laws, S. CHINA
July 15, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 2270087; Sharon Cheung,
Support for Scrapping of Union Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 1997, at 6,
available in 1997 WL 2271607; Sharon Cheung & Chris Yeung, Law Freeze Set to Go
MORNING POST,

Through, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2270037;

Laws Ditched in Society's Interest, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 22, 1997, at 6,
available in 1997 WL 13261056; Angela Li et al., Pre-July 1 Laws Frozen, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 17, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2270394; Chris Yeung, A
Trade Off With the Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 1997, at 17; Elsie Yiu,
Warning on Labour Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 6, available in

1997 WL 2269761.
22. Publicly Opinionated Public Opinion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 5, 1997, at
12, available in 1997 WL 1329946; see also Boosting Competition, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 5, 1997, at 18, available in 1997 WL 13269968; Gren Manuel & Oliver
Poole, Call for Tough Law on Unfair Trading Branded 'Overkill,' S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Nov. 4, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 132699887.
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toward breaking up Hong Kong's cartels, which owed their success as
much to personal connections as to productivity.23
The structure of Hong Kong's government grew more centralized in
1997. Notably, the government cut back the franchise for legislative
elections from 2.7 million, which was the number of people eligible to
vote in the 1995 election of the Legislative Council, to about 400, the
number of members of the Election Committee selected by Beijing to
elect the Provisional Legislature which replaced the Legislative Council
on July 1, 1997. Furthermore, it curtailed the franchise in elections of
district urban councils, which were created in the early 1980s to
involve Hong Kong citizens in the upkeep and improvement of their
neighborhoods. Before July 1997, civic matters such as governmental
funding of the arts, were dispersed among several organizations, but
as of July 1997, these matters are concentrated in a single government
run body.
Within Hong Kong's political culture, there was a quieting of
dissenting views and conflicting interests. Public remarks by highlevel officials sent clear signals that legal disagreements should not be
aired, even though formal channels were established for that purpose.
The Provisional Legislature's President, Rita Fan, stated, "[t]he public
should judge whether it is a waste of money for Hong Kong's Legal
Aid to assist children from the PRC who are challenging in court the
Hong Kong government's effort to deport them under a new
Provisional Legislature law."24 In addition, Tung Chee-hwa's top
housing advisor admonished the Provisional Legislature for criticizing
the SAR government and not cooperating with it by "making
legislation to meet the progress of its projects."25
Other new local leaders admitted that they were not interested in
public opinion and even favored punishment for some expressions of
it. Provisional Legislator Charles Yeung Chun-kam criticized people
who challenged the legitimacy of the Provisional Legislature stating
that, "they have wasted too much time and news coverage discussing
our legality and power. We have carried out our tasks in a practical
manner. Excessive criticism will not win any sympathy., 26 Similarly,
23. See Consumer Crusaders Catch Cold Shoulder, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 4,
1997, at 12, available in 1997 WL 13269763.
24. See Michael Davis, Threat to Integrity, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 20, 1997,
at 10; May Sin-Mi Hon, HK Ruling on Children 'Vital for Autonomy,' S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 18, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2270515.
25. Sharon Cheung, Tung Aide in 'Rubber Stamp' Row, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July

25, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2271408.
26. Democrats to 'Make Good' Interim Body's Image, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug.

18, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 13260527.
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Provisional Legislator Chim Pui-chung proposed outlawing the failure
to stand at attention during the playing of Hong Kong's national
anthem and any "showing [of] impoliteness" during the raising of
Hong Kong's flag.27

Self-censorship, whose rise in Hong Kong has been widely
acknowledged since the early 1990s, has dampened the publication of
some opinions. For example, the South China Morning Postcanceled
a popular comic strip because it attacked the PRC.28 Similarly, in
October 1997, Hong Kong's film distributors declined to import three
American films, Seven Years in Tibet, Kundun, and Red Corner, that
were critical of the PRC.2 9 All but one local theater shunned a local
film that focused on the dark side of life in Hong Kong's poorer
neighborhoods.3" Rupert Murdoch dropped the BBC international
service from the television station he bought in Hong Kong. Another
Hong Kong television station in 1993 canceled a documentary on the
Tiananmen uprising. 3 ' Local pager companies failed to send the
messages of student groups about the anniversary of the Tiananmen
Square incident in June 1997, and in October 1997, deleted part of a
message from the Democratic Party staff regarding a protest against
Tung Chee-hwa that they were organizing.32
Although public protests were staged after the handover, police took
actions to curb them. For example, police resorted to unorthodox
methods to limit the impact of the April 5th Action Group's
demonstration during the handover, blasting a recording of
Beethoven's music into the area.33 On October 10, 1997, the police
tore down twenty-two Taiwanese flags hoisted on public buildings and
27. Wendy Lim Wan-Yee, Laws Mulled on Disrespect to Flag, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 21, 1997, at 6, available in 1997 WL 13260947.
28.

See MARK ROBERTI, THE FALL OF HONG KONG: CHINA'S TRIUMPH & BRITAIN'S

BETRAYAL 324-25 (2d ed. 1996).
29. See Image Conscious, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 20, 1997, at 20, available in
1997 WL 13268046; New Films on Tibet Shunned, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19,
1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13268246.
30. See Edward A. Gargan, For China to Ponder: The Dark Side of Easy Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at A4.

31. In early 1998 Murdoch also ordered HarperCollins, one of his companies, to
cancel its book contract with former Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten, after he
had turned in half of his manuscript. See Publisher Apologizes to Ex-Hong Kong
Governor Over Book Cancellation, STAR TRIB., Mar. 7, 1998, at A17, available in 1997

WL 6344340.
32. See May Sin-Mi Hon, Pager Firms Told Not to Censor Messages, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 25,

1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 13268719; No Kwai-Yan,

Pager Protest Messages Deleted, Say Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24,
1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 13268589.
33. See Lee, supra note 15, at 7.
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walkways. 34 Two weeks later, they pushed back about sixty poorquality housing project residents from the gated entrance to Tung
Chee-hwa's home.35 Police also cordoned off a group of protestors at
the World Bank meeting in Hong Kong and physically provoked them
to defend themselves. The police then used the protesters' attempts at
self-protection as a pretext for arresting them for assaulting police.3 6
In early January 1998, police videotaped two people who fastened a
Taiwanese flag and a defaced Hong Kong flag to a barrier outside of
Tung Chee-hwa's office.37 Police also hauled away protesters when

they gathered in front of the former residence of the Hong Kong
governor to protest the visit of Yang Shang-kun, a past president and
military leader of the PRC.3 8

Apart from creating a climate which fostered legal harmonization,
Hong Kong's leaders also took direct action to promote harmonization
of Hong Kong law and policy with that of the PRC. In July 1997,
Solicitor General Daniel Fung argued before the High Court in
HKSAR v. Davis Ma Waikwan that where the Basic Law conflicts
with other PRC law, PRC law governs. In support, Fung pointed to
the conflict between the provision in Article 9 of the Basic Law, which
provides that both English and Chinese are official languages of the
Basic Law, and a decision by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress, which provides that the primary language of the
Basic Law is Chinese. Notably, the Basic Law, as the Hong Kong
SAR's constitution, is the supreme local law of Hong Kong, while a
decision of the Standing Committee of the NPC is one of the lowest
forms of law in the hierarchy of legal forms in the PRC. The
implication of Fung' s argument is that Hong Kong law holds a status
vastly inferior to that of PRC law. As conflicts arise, therefore, any
expression of PRC law will replace Hong Kong law on those issues.
This rule for handling conflicts of law questions in Hong Kong is a
powerful device for legal harmonization.

34. See Image Conscious,supra note 29, at 20.
35. See Ng Kang-Chung, Must We Wait Until Someone Is Crushed to Death Before the
Government Does Something About it?, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 1997, at 3,
available in 1997 WL 13268855; Billy Wong Wai-Yuk, March on Tung Flat Blocked by
Police, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 25, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 13268717.

36. See Audiotape of All Things Considered: Hong Kong's Transition, broadcasted on
National Public Radio (Nov. 24, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12834460.
37. See Demonstrators Deface Flag of China in Hong Kong Rally, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2,
1998, § 1, at 3.
38. See Hong Kong: Ex-China Leader Protested, STAR TRIB., Jan. 6, 1998, at A6,
available in 1997 WL 6336168.
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The scope of the responsibilities of the fifty-six year old Hong
Kong Planning Authority appears to be growing, but its policies in
1997 portend a significant accommodation of PRC policy. In October
1997, its director wrote, "Hong Kong will have to co-operate and coordinate more with our neighbouring territories in the Pearl River Delta
and beyond. To work jointly with our mainland partners will be
essential for the continual growth and development in Hong Kong."3 9
Mainland China and Hong Kong police forces strengthened their
ties after the handover. When the Hong Kong Junior Police Officers'
Association celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its founding in
October 1997, it invited for the first time officials from the PRC's
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry's provincial bureaus. The
Association's spokesperson explained that, "now we are part of
China, we want to invite them to join in to establish a closer link."''
Top legal officials in Hong Kong have publicly expressed their
willingness to coordinate with PRC lawmakers. Provisional
Legislator Ngan Kam-chuen declared his support for the merging of
Hong Kong and Shenzhen railroads by stating that, "it is good to have
more co-ordination."41 Similarly, the President of Hong Kong's Law
Society signaled his willingness to work with PRC jurists when he
adopted an official PRC style of discourse about law for one of his
speeches. In his speech he announced that the purpose of the seventh
annual Law Week was to "improve the public's understanding of the
legal system, ' '42 a sentiment that is alien to Hong Kong's legal culture
but which is a stock phrase in official media dispatches in the PRC
about law.43

The Basic Law Committee, a creature of the Basic Law, appears to
be designed to facilitate the harmonization of Hong Kong and PRC
law. Appointed in July 1997 and beginning its work in the summer of
1998, the Committee is a hybrid body, with half of its members from
Hong Kong and half from the PRC. The Committee's formal duties,
which focus on advising the NPC Standing Committee in Beijing
when constitutional issues arise from Hong Kong courts, make it a
39. Peter K.S. Pun, Smoothing the Way on Long, Bumpy Road, S. CHINA MORNING

POST, Oct. 20, 1997, at 27, available in 1997 WL 13268053.
40. Stella Lee, Mainland Security Officials Invited to Local Police Party, S. CHINA
MORNING POST,

41.

Oct. 27, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL 13268866.

Ng Kang-Chung, Planfor Huge Rail Merger, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 19,

1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 13260685.
42. Tuesday, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 20, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL
13268056.
43. See Cliff Buddle, Warning of Mainland Danger, Complacency 'Threatens Legal
System,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 22, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL 13268232.
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powerful liaison between Hong Kong and PRC lawmakers. Although
the Committee's advice does not necessarily bind the NPC Standing
Committee, the NPC's advice to the Hong Kong courts is binding on
the Hong Kong courts." Even outside of their responsibilities on the
Basic Law Committee, the members are actively engaged in bridging
the gulf between Hong Kong and PRC law. One member,45 for
example, arranged to teach at Beijing University Law Department
during the fall of 1998 just as the Committee was gearing up to
perform its functions.
On the legislative front, although the PRC government had slated
only 1.3 percent of Hong Kong's laws and regulations to expire at the
handover, those that did expire included laws that arguably imposed
the greatest limitations on the Hong Kong government of any Hong
Kong law. Those provisions, in the Hong Kong Bill of Rights,
declared invalid all previous and subsequent laws which conflicted
with the Bill of Rights. In effect, the provisions created a private right
of action for individuals to challenge Hong Kong laws. They were a
potentially powerful tool to defeat any agenda of the Hong Kong
government. The removal of those provisions, therefore, paved the
way for harmonization more than would have the removal of laws that
limited government less. To add to the potential impact of this
legislative change, the NPC Standing Committee earmarked an
additional unspecified number of laws and regulations for amendment
at some unspecified time.
The laws that were amended in the months immediately following
the handover also had imposed limitations on Hong Kong's
government, and their amendments all remade Hong Kong law to
conform more closely to PRC law. Two of the Hong Kong statutes
amended by the Provisional Legislature in its first lawmaking act
govern civil liberties. Those amendments gave the government broad
power to curtail public demonstrations for "national security" reasons.
Moreover, the government was empowered to shut down private
organizations based on the broad finding of possessing "foreign" ties.
About the same time, the Executive Council, a powerful body that
advises the Chief Executive, issued guidelines to Hong Kong police
which relied on the "national security" concept to specifically ban any
advocacy of Taiwanese or Tibetan independence from PRC rule. This
definition comports exactly with PRC policy regarding freedom of
expression regarding Taiwan and Tibet. Another significant set of
44. See Basic Law, supra note 2, at Art. 158.

45. Anthony Neoh, the Hong Kong attorney and former head of the body that
regulated Hong Kong's securities trading.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

640

[Vol. 30

amendments retracted laws which had permitted collective bargaining
and had created a private right of action for dismissal for engaging in
union activities. These amendments move Hong Kong law closer to
PRC law, which does not recognize collective bargaining or unions.
A set of amendments to Hong Kong's immigration law in the
SAR's first months further removed differences between Hong Kong
and PRC law. Specifically, the Provisional Legislature enacted
provisions to slow the immigration of mainland children to Hong
Kong who are seeking to claim a right of abode under Article 23(2)(3)
of the Basic Law.4 6 The Provisional Legislature implemented
regulations of the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Bureau to
moderate the tide of these entrants to Hong Kong. Now, for people to
meet the requirements for "right-of-abode" status under Article
23(2)(3), they must apply to that PRC bureau for a one-way permit
and wait, on a first-come-first-serve basis, until their number turns up
on a daily quota system created and operated by the bureau.
As a further sign of coordination between Hong Kong and PRC
immigration law, the PRC central leadership assumed the
responsibility for developing policies to implement the Hong Kong
Provisional Legislature's amendments. The Guangdong Provincial
Government and the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau Administration
of Aliens and Exit-Entry promulgated the policies, while the Hong
Kong Immigration Department joined those Guangdong agencies in
implementing them.47 Further, Hong Kong's Court of First Instance

ruled in October 1997 that the Provisional Legislature's new enactment
was constitutional, notwithstanding the argument that it limited the
right of abode, previously accorded constitutional status under the
Basic Law.48
Further evidence of collaboration between Hong Kong and
Guangdong immigration authorities surfaced in Spring 1998, in the
case of PRC dissident Wang Bingzhang. Wang had been traveling for
46. The legal term "right to abode" was imported into Hong Kong law from British
law for the first time in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and then by
amendment in 1987 to the Hong Kong Immigration Ordinance. It is a term used to
describe the right to enter and live free of the threat of deportation. See Basic Law, supra
note 2, at Art. 24 (discussing who may assert the right of abode).
47. See Ng Kang-Chung & Shirley Kwok, Giving Permits to Guangdong Upsets
Migrants, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 19, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL
13260681; Ng Kang-Chung, Policy Criticism Elicits Rare Reply From Shenzhen, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 20, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13260794; Defending
the System, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 20, 1997, at 16, available in 1997 WL

13260747.
48.

See May Sin-Mi Hon, Elsie Leung Opts Out of NPC Poll, S. CHINA MORNING POST,

Oct. 19, 1997, at 2, available in 1997 WL 13268243.
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several years between the United States, Canada, Hong Kong, the
PRC, and Taiwan with fake travel documents. Wang was apparently
aided by a tacit understanding with Hong Kong and United States
customs officials that they would not challenge the validity of his
papers. In March 1998, however, Wang tried to enter Hong Kong
only to be turned back by Hong Kong customs authorities. Wang
alleged that the Hong Kong customs officials were obeying orders
from the PRC government. A reporter from the Chinese edition of the
Voice of America confided to the author in a personal interview that,
notwithstanding a rigorous denial by Hong Kong authorities that they
were following PRC orders, Wang's accusation was plausible. Hong
Kong does not have an extradition treaty with the PRC; even if it did,
its validity under international law would be suspect. As a result,
Hong Kong has served as a haven for Chinese activists from Taiwan
and the PRC who dispute PRC policy for the last several decades.
Since the handover, however, Hong Kong has taken steps to abandon
this role because it may be viewed as encouragement of positions that
directly contradict PRC law and policy.
Yet another law, passed by the Provisional Legislature as part of its
first act, entitled the "Reunification Bill," promotes harmonization by
undermining the longterm potential for English law to continue its
influence on the development of Hong Kong law. Staving off the
potential for continued English influence on Hong Kong law is one
way to move the trajectory of its development closer to that of PRC
law, which is hardly, if at all, influenced by English law. The
Reunification Bill provides, "provisions applying any English law may
continue to be applicable ...

as a transitional arrangement pending

their amendment by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
through the Legislature thereof, provided that they are not prejudicial
to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China and do not
contravene the provisions of the Basic Law."49 This statute does not
define the scope of the phrases, "prejudicial to the sovereignty of the
PRC," or, "contravene the provisions of the Basic Law." The
Reunification Bill, therefore, creates the potential for Hong Kong
courts or the legislature to place major limitations on the applicability
of English law, including those rules and doctrines that have
underpinned the commercial system of Hong Kong for a century.
Based on the text of this provision alone, the chances of this
happening appear to be better than even, since the Reunification Bill
states that English law is applicable in the Hong Kong SAR merely "as
49. Hong Kong Reunification Bill, ART. 2A(2)(e) (1997).
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a transitional arrangement."
III. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR HARMONIZATION

The harmonization of Hong Kong and PRC law did not begin at
midnight on June 30, 1997. The PRC government began a campaign
to harmonize the legal systems of the PRC and Hong Kong in the early
1980s. At that time, it created a pretext for reshaping Hong Kong's
laws by representing Hong Kong law as a metaphor for British
imperialism.5 ° In the mid-1990s the Xinhua news service annually
sent dozens of articles about Hong Kong to the Hong Kong SAR,
laden with legal terminology developed in the PRC's legal framework
and with the themes that comprised the agenda for discussion in
Beijing by the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. 5 ' By the end of
1995, the Legal Sub-Group of the Preliminary Working Committee for
setting up the Preparatory Committee of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region had completed evaluations of 600 Hong Kong
laws and drawn conclusions about whether to retain or modify them.52
50. See He Delong, Xianggang falu zhongwenhua renwu fanzhong richeng jin [The
Translation of Hong Kong Law into Chinese Is a Task Whose Urgency Brings a
Strenuous Schedule], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYS. DAILY], Nov. 19, 1995, at 4.
5 1. See Xinhua, Joint Group Discusses HK Issues, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 3, 1995, at I.
According to the Xinhua newsservice, legal terms included the following:
International rights and obligations, air services agreements and
arrangements with Taiwan, protection agreements, surrender of fugitive
offenders, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters...
civil service matters, defense and public order, franchises and contracts
extending beyond 1997, sewage disposal and investment promotion ....
localization of laws, adaptation of laws, the court of final appeal, the
implementation of the provisions of the Joint Declaration relating to the
right of abode in Hong Kong after 1997, visa abolition agreements,
retirement protection and social welfare.
Id.
During the negotiations between the PRC and the United Kingdom which led to their
signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984, the two sovereigns agreed to cooperate during
the ten years until the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong when major issues about
the transfer arose. The body they set up to implement the cooperation came to be called
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. See Roberti, supra note 28 at 105-09.
52. See Fang Jin, Guangrong, wushi de licheng--xianggang tebie xingzhengqu chou
weihui yuweihuiyuan man wancheng shiming [The Course of Glory and Responsibility-the Members of the Preliminary Working Committee for Setting up the Preparatory
Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Fully Complete Their
Mission], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Dec. 10, 1995, at 4.
The central government of the PRC appointed the Preliminary Working Committee to
implement PRC policies regarding Hong Kong before the handover. The Preparatory
Committee was a body of 150 people, 56 from the PRC and 94 from Hong Kong, chosen
by the central government of the PRC in January 1996 to select the 400 member
Selection Committee. See Roberti, supra note 28, at 304. The Selection Committee
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The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group also completed a comprehensive
review of Hong Kong's laws a year and a half before the handover.53
By that time, officials had already denounced as invalid certain laws
enacted by the Hong Kong Legislative Council before 1997.5
China's moves to reshape Hong Kong's legal system in its image
did not explicitly contradict the legal rubric created for the retrocession
of Hong Kong. The arrangement under the PRC Constitution of
1982, the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, and the Basic Law
promulgated in 1990 outlined in only broad terms the bounds of
autonomy to be enjoyed by Hong Kong. The breadth of these terms
suggests that their drafts intentionally left room for the harmonization
of Hong Kong's legal system with that of the PRC. The Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law both promise that Hong Kong is free to
remain capitalist and autonomous until the year 2047. They further
provide that as an SAR of the PRC, Hong Kong will enjoy, "a high
degree of autonomy, except in foreign affairs and defense."55 More
specific provisions provide for an independent tax system, the
continued circulation of the Hong Kong currency, and autonomy in
levying customs duties.5 6 These provisions did not clarify, however,
chose the first post-1997 governor and the members of the Provisional Legislative
Council, which at midnight June 30, 1997 replaced the Legislative Council elected in
1995. See id.
53. See id.; Fang Jin & Zhao Xinbing, Xianggang tequ chouweihui yuweihui jingji
zhuanti xiaozu, juxing zuihou yici huiyi zongjie liangnianban de gongzuo [Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region Preparatory Committee's Advance Committee's
Economic Special Topic Subcommittee Holds Last Meeting To Summarize Two and a
Half Years of Work], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Nov. 12, 1995, at 4; Xianggang
chouweihui linshi lifa hui xiaozu juxing shouci huiyi [Hong Kong Preparatory
Committee Provisional Legislative Subcommittee Holds Its First Meeting], FAZHI RIBAO
[LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 21, 1996, at 2; Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu chouweihui
guanyu dui 'zhonghuarenmin gongheguo guojifa' zai xianggang tebie xingzhengqu
shishi zuochu jieshi de jianyi [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Preparatory
Committee Regarding 'PRC Nationality Law' Proposes Implementation Interpretation
for Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYS. DAILY], Mar.

26, 1996, at 2; Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu chouweihui guanyu sheli xianggang tebie
xingzhengqu linshi lifahui de jueding [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Preparatory Committee Regarding Resolution for Establishing a Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Transitional Legislature], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar.
26, 1996, at 2.
54. See Xinhua, Ministry Clarifies Japan, HK Stance, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 15, 1995, at
2 (stating that China does not consider the "so-called Bill of Rights of Hong Kong"
adopted in 1991 as valid).
55. Yash Ghai, The Constitutional Framework, in HONG KONG IN TRANSITION:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 11, 19 (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1993); Key Figures in Hong
Kong Mark Basic Law's Anniversary, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 5, 1993, at 4.
56. See David Campbell, Economic Ideology and Hong Kong's Governance Structure
After 1997, in HONG KONG, CHINA AND 1997 87, 91-2 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1993).
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how closely connected the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region's legal system would be to the PRC's legal system. By
inventing a new term for Hong Kong's status, the "Special
Administrative Region," the drafters of these legal documents avoided
specifying the connection between PRC and Hong Kong law because
Hong Kong could not be analogized to internationally recognizable
political units, such as the protectorate, the province, the federated
state, or the allied state.
Under the terms of PRC domestic law, Hong Kong's status would
be both independent from and subordinate to the PRC central
government. On the one hand, the Joint Declaration provides that
Hong Kong will maintain political and legal autonomy, and the Basic
Law provides that Hong Kong will enjoy "a high degree of
autonomy," except in "foreign affairs" and "national security." On the
other hand, the Basic Law subordinates Hong Kong to the PRC
through its requirement that Hong Kong's legislature report all of its
legislation to the National People's Congress Standing Committee in
Beijing. This Basic Law requirement puts the Hong Kong legislature
on the same footing as the provincial people's congresses on the
mainland. Similarly, the Basic Law provides that the National
People's Congress Standing Committee may invalidate any Hong
Kong legislation that the Standing Committee deems to conflict with
the Basic Law or subsequent legislation passed by the National
People's Congress for application in Hong Kong.57
The idea of legal harmonization did, however, run contrary to some
official press releases and televised speeches made in January and
February of 1984, during the negotiation of the Joint Declaration,
which stressed Hong Kong's legal autonomy in a way that implied that
the PRC would have no say regarding the content of Hong Kong
laws. The language evoked images of legislators and judges in Hong
Kong making law without approval from Beijing.58 Between 1984
and 1996, however, the type of autonomy promised to Hong Kong in
the PRC media changed. While media transmissions in 1984 had
stressed the promise of both political and economic autonomy, by
1996 the PRC media emphasized the economic autonomy of Hong
57. See Zhou Wei, The Sources of Law in the SAR, in HONG KONG IN TRANSITION:
79, 82, 86-87 (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1993).
58. See Ji Pengfei Answers Questions on Hong Kong Issue, FBIS, CHI-84-019, Jan.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

27, 1984, at El-E2; PRC Official Discusses Plans For Hong Kong, FBIS, CHI-84-015,
Jan. 23, 1984, at E2; Ji Pengfei Explains Voting Rights After 1997, FBIS, CHI-84-007,
Jan. 11, 1984, at W1-W2; Ji Pengfei on Post 1997 Government Currency, FBIS, CHI84-004, Jan. 6, 1984, at WI; Xinhua Chief Discusses Democracy For Hong Kong, FBIS,

CHI-84-013, Jan. 19, 1984, at W2-W3.
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Kong after 199759 and confirmed the administrative and legal unity of
Hong Kong and the PRC.6 °

The later stress on legal unity is particularly apparent in the official
reports about the Preliminary Working Committee and the Hong Kong
SAR Preparatory Committee, two bodies established by the PRC
central government to implement the provisions of the Basic Law.
These reports pronounced that the PRC central government had the
authority to both make and nullify law in Hong Kong. Such reports
confirmed that by 1995 the Committee was already reviewing Hong
Kong legislation for consistency with PRC national law. By early
1996, the Committee was taking steps to select the first governor and
the first legislature of the Hong Kong SAR. 6' Establishing the
Preparatory Committee as the focal point for representative lawmaking was tantamount to nullifying the then-current Legislative
Council in Hong Kong which, since Governor Chris Patten's reforms,
had become more directly elected by Hong Kong citizens. Although
59. See Hong Kong: Official Tax System Not to Change After 1997, FBIS-CHI-96047, Mar. 8, 1996, at 84-5; Lu Xinhua, HK to Stay Successful, CHINA DAILY, May 31,
1996, at 1 ("Factors that have promoted Hong Kong's economic success, such as a
highly-open economic system, free movement of personnel, cargo and capital, low
tariffs, sound legal institutions and scarce governmental intervention will be preserved
in Hong Kong after 1997."); Xinhua (Singapore), State to Ensure Democratic HK: Lu,
CHINA DAILY, June 12, 1996, at 2 ("There is no need to fear for democracy in Hong Kong
after 1997 .... Except for foreign affairs and defense, which will be handled by the
central government, everything else will remain the same: the legal system, the
existing lifestyle, the currency, the economic and financial policies and so on.");
Xinhua (Tokyo), No Worries for HK Economy, CHINA DAILY, June 5, 1996, at 2 (It was
"reiterated that the Chinese Government will permit Hong Kong to maintain its free
economy under the 'one country, two systems' concept after the region returns to China
in 1997 ....
The present social and economic structures as well as citizens' lifestyles in
Hong Kong will not change at all ....

With the exception of diplomatic relations and

defence, Hong Kong will have full autonomy."); ("Comrade Deng Xiaoping's principle
of 'one country, two systems' means that on the condition of one China, the mainland
as the main body of the country persists in a socialist system and Hong Kong will
preserve its capitalist system. The two systems will remain unchanged with neither
replacing the other."); Hong Kong: Li Peng Interviewed by Hong Kong Dailies, FBISCHI-96-024, Feb. 5, 1996, at 84-9; PRC: Trade Minister Assures Hong Kong of Bright
Future, FBIS-CHI-96-020, Jan. 30, 1996, p. 87.
60. See CD News, Great Hall to Set Up HK Court, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 21, 1996, at 3
("Since the completion of the Great Hall of the Peole in 1959 it has been a practice that
each Chinese province, autonomous region, or municipality has an individual court in
the Great Hall."); PRC: Lu Ping on Post-1997 Hong Kong Self-Government, FBIS-CHI96-013, Jan. 19, 1996, at 84-5. ("The Basic Law is valid not only in Hong Kong but
also in the whole country. All provinces and cities and all people in the mainland must
abide by the Basic Law when they are involved in affairs related to Hong Kong.").
61. See Xie Liangjun, Deleting of Hong Kong Legislation Stirs Concern, CHINA
DAILY, July 19, 1995, at 11, available in 1997 WL 7962496; China Approves Creation
of Panel To Preparefor Hong Kong Takeover, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1993, at A33; Sheryl
WuDunn, China Raises Ante Over Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at A7.
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Patten vowed to remain within the limit of the Basic Law's limit stating

that only one-third of its members can participate in universal elections
of Legislative Council, he defined the groups who were eligible to

elect the other members broadly enough to include about a third of
Hong Kong's population.62 The Preparatory Committee's identification with "self-rule" softened the Joint Declaration's promises of
political and legal autonomy because it narrowed the scope of the
"self."
Signs of legal harmonization before the handover appeared
throughout 1995 and 1996 in the PRC press. They are particularly
apparent in the PRC press summaries of the initiatives of the PRC
central government to prepare Hong Kong for its official incorporation
into the PRC on July 1, 1997. The PRC press reported the steps
already taken by the PRC government to instill in Hong Kong officials
the practices of the mainland's bureaucracy 63 and the steps it took
before the handover to create its own court of final appeal for Hong

62. For a more detailed description of Patten's reforms, see Roberti, supra note 28, at
295.
63. See Xianggang fating shouci shiyong zhongwen shen'an [Hong Kong Courts For
the First Time Use Chinese Language To Try Cases], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY],
June 12, 1995, at 1; Luo Baowen, Yao ba jiang zhengzhi de yaoqiu luoshi dao lingdao
ganbu zishen jianshe he budui gexiang jianshe zhong qu, [We Need Leading Cadres,
Departments, and Troops to Individually Establish Explanations of Government
Requirements], FAZHI RIBAO, [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 12, 1996, at 1; Beijing Xinhua
Service, Xianggang tebie xingzhengqu chouweihui yubei gongzuo weiyuanhui guanyu
baochi xianggang gongwuyuan duiwu he zhidu wending de ruogan yijian [The Hong
Kong Special Administration Region Preparatory Committee Prepares Work on the
Committee Meeting Related to a Certain Number of Opinions About Supporting the
Stabilization of Hong Kong Civil Servants Troops and System], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL
Sys. DAILY], Dec. 11, 1995, at 2; He Delong, Xianggang falu zhongwenhua renwu
fanzhong richeng jin, [The Translation of Hong Kong Law into Chinese Is a Task Whose
Urgency Brings a Strenuous Schedule], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Nov. 19, 1995,

at 4; Lian Jintian, Liu Siyang, Zhao Xinbing, Li Ruihuan tong gang'ao diqu zhengxie
weiyuan zuotan [Li Ruihuan Holds Informal Talks With Members of the Hong KongMacao Area Government Joint Committee], FAZHI RIBAO [ LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 12,
1996, at 2; Xinhua, Classes Train HK Workers, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 26, 1996, at 2
(stating that those who "expressed the desire to stay with the civil service beyond 1997"
were selected to undergo training courses in Guangzhou); Xinhua, HK Delegates Call on
Mainland Office, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 6, 1996, at 2 (stating that a group of Hong Kong
residents who were likely candidates for public office in the HK SAR "acquaint[ed]
themselves with functions and structures of the [State Planning Commission] and the
ministries [of the PRC central government]."); Xinhua, Mainland, HK to Meet More
Often, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 15, 1996, at 2 (stating that Chinese government officials and
Hong Kong civil servants "increased their exchanges and understanding."); Xiao Qiao,
Xianggang jiangwei gongwuyuan kaishe zhongwen keicheng, [Hong Kong In Future
Will Offer Civil Servants Chinese Language Courses], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY],
Nov. 12, 1995, at 4.
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Kong. 64 Some of the press reports described the significant input by
the PRC government into the short-term fiscal planning for Hong
Kong's government and the selection of the SAR's governor and
legislators.65
In addition to the affirmative evidence of the PRC's deliberate
promotion of legal harmonization publicized in the PRC press, there
were some less obvious, yet still detectable, signs of harmonization in
the Hong Kong press. One such sign was the coordination of
immigration policies,66 which explains in part the drop in receipts
experienced by Hong Kong's tourism industry in 1997. The PRC's
restriction on travel by PRC citizens to Hong Kong during the months
immediately before and after the handover also contributed to a steep
downturn in tourism that year.67
IV. PUTTING HONG KONG'S LEGAL CHANGES INPERSPECTIVE
While legal harmonization had already begun by the time Hong
Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty, the handover marked an
intensification of the harmonization of PRC and Hong Kong law.
Relying on the sheer quantity of statutory provisions changed during
the year following the handover, the magnitude of change to the Hong
Kong legal system appears to be relatively small. By recognizing that
some provisions are more important than others and that the import of
some changes is more dramatic than others, however, the change to
Hong Kong's legal system in its first year as an SAR of the PRC
64. See Sun Chengbin, Zhongying lianhe lianluo xiaozu diwuci, xianggang
zhongshen fayuan wenti zhuanjia huiyi jieshu [Policy of Fifth Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group Meeting of Experts on The Problem of Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL Sys. DAILY], Mar. 26, 1995, at 4; Xinhua, No Concessions
Made in Recent HK Court Talks, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 27, 1995, at 2 (The Sino-British
Joint Liaison Group on Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal met to establish the HK
Court of Final Appeal, which is provided for in the Basic Law).
65. See Hong Kong Reforms Pass; China Ends Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at
A6; Patrick E. Tyler, China to DisregardHong Kong Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994, at
A10; Hong Kong: Mainland Seeks More Control Over 1997-98 Budget, FBIS-CHI-96036, Feb. 21, 1996, at 83, ("Chinese ... views need to be respected when the budget is
mainly concerned with post-colonial Hong Kong."); Xie Liangjun, NPC Sets Up HK
Council, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 25, 1996, at 1 ("The current Legislative Council of Hong
Kong will be dissolved on June 30, 1997 ..
"); Xinhua, Economic Panel Mulls Hong
Kong Budget, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 27, 1996, at 2 ("The 1997-98 financial budget of Hong
Kong should be compiled jointly by the Chinese side, the British side, and yet-to-beappointed chief executive and leading body of the [HK SAR].").
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the coordination of
immigration policies by Hong Kong and China).
67. See May Sin-Mi Hon, Foreign Media Blamed for 4pc Drop in Tourism, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 4, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL 13269879.
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appears to be of no small magnitude.
These changes suggest a pattern of accelerating harmonization of
Hong Kong law with PRC law, a process that has been well-planned
and progressive. Since the groundwork for the changes that were
formalized in 1997 and 1998 was laid years earlier, there is no reason
to believe that the groundwork for future harmonization is not being
laid right now.6 8

The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal's recent decision that
established the Hong Kong courts' jurisdiction over issues of the
however, may
conformity of PRC acts with the Basic Law, 69
slow the pace of this harmonization, because this holding will likely
make it more difficult for Beijing to nullify Hong Kong laws.
Beijing's reaction to the decision, however, is fully consistent with a
policy of promoting harmonization. Apparently, top officials
authorized PRC legal scholars to protest the decision on the ground
that it usurped the authority of the National People's Congress.7 °
Thus, despite the court's ruling, it is likely that the harmonization of
the two legal systems will continue for years to come. The
harmonization process may even accelerate because the legislature of
Hong Kong during its first year as an SAR was empowered only to
enact laws which are "indispensable" to the SAR. The Legislative
Council elected in May 1998, however, enjoys full legislative power
under the Basic Law, and therefore, can do more to move Hong Kong
law closer to PRC law and do it faster. Although Democratic Party
members, known as fearless critics of the PRC, won a majority of the
seats up for popular election in May 1998, they constitute only a small
minority of the total body, about one sixth. The number of elected
seats will grow at a modest pace under the Basic Law during the next
several years, 7' but it will be over a decade before the seats reach a
68. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (discussing the groundwork for the
changes that were formalized in 1997 and 1998).
69. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
70. See Elizabeth Rosenthal, Ruling Sparks China-Hong Kong Clash, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 11, 1999, at 9A. It is difficult to know exactly how much the
subsequent explanation of that decision issued as an extraordinary measure to satisfy the
PRC protestors will weaken the holding of that decision. But regardless of its impact,
this explanation, and the outcry that prompted it, confirm that Beijing and the Hong
Kong government are pursuing a policy of harmonizing their legal systems.
71. Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
provides that 24 popularly elected legislators will serve in the second term of the
Legislative Council, and 30 will serve in the third term, up from 20 in its first term.
Each term is four years. The total number of seats is 60. For an English translation of
this provision, see Zhongguo renmin gongheguo xianggang tebie xingzhengqu jibenfa
[The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
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number which will allow advocates for legal divergence to dictate
outcomes.
What parts of the Hong Kong legal system will change the most in
the coming years? The laws amended in the SAR's first year were
confined to those touching upon civil liberties and limitations upon
government power, areas that fall under the rubrics of constitutional
law, civil rights law, labor law, and immigration law. Commercial
law, however, has remained virtually untouched. Is a pattern of
harmonization emerging in Hong Kong that leaves commercial law
intact as other more politically sensitive areas merge with the PRC?
The wording of the Basic Law and Beijing's official pronouncements
about Hong Kong stress the economic autonomy of the new SAR.
However, the Hong Kong government's decision in the fall of 1997
not to introduce an antitrust law works against legal continuity for
economic matters in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong had no
antitrust law before the handover, the failure to introduce such a law is
tantamount to derailing a process that began with the 1966 Application
of English Law Ordinance, which updated Hong Kong commercial
law to keep pace with developments in the industrialized economies of
the world. Seemingly, antitrust law was an inevitable addition to
Hong Kong's legal system, and it would have mirrored a trend in
Japan and Europe during the past decade.
Hong Kong's decision to reject antitrust law may be the most
significant signal indicating the direction that Hong Kong's legal
changes will take in the next few years. As antitrust law does not
regulate political expression, it falls within the bounds of Hong
Kong's autonomy over "economic" matters as drawn in the Basic Law
and official PRC pronouncements. At the same time, any development
of this area of law in Hong Kong would diverge from PRC law
because the PRC has no developed antitrust law. Despite the lack of
political overtones to antitrust law, this divergence proved to be
intolerable to the Hong Kong SAR government. Presumably, then,
no commercial law in Hong Kong is immune from harmonization with
PRC commercial law. Commercial law, therefore, may be the area to
look to for the most significant convergence of Hong Kong law with
PRC law in the coming decade.

Republic of China]; Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annex II; see also id. at Art. 68-69.

